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Will GATT Take a Bite Out of the Organic
Food Production Act of 1990?
Rick Franzen
Consumers worldwide are purchasing organic food products
in ever-increasing numbers. As a consequence, numerous coun-
tries, including the United States, have enacted laws designed
to ensure that what consumers are purchasing is, in fact, or-
ganic. These laws, which often include a labeling requirement,
may implicate provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) or its side agreements.' The specific issue of
whether labeling programs which allow distinctions based on
production and processing methods violate GATT was not re-
solved by the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel de-
cision in the celebrated Beef Hormones case. 2 In that case, the
Panel recognized the possibility of a voluntary labeling program
as an alternative to the European Union's prohibition on beef
grown with the assistance of hormones. 3 The Panel, however,
specifically declined to decide whether such a program would vi-
olate GATT or its side agreements. 4
A voluntary labeling law which is similar to the one ad-
dressed in the Beef Hormones case is the United States' Organic
Food Production Act of 1990 (OFPA).5 The OFPA allows organic
farming and production operations to affix a United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) "certified organic" label to or-
ganic food. The OFPA endeavors to bring consistency to existing
state organic labeling laws by implementing a national organic
standard.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT.
2. Panel Report on "EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones)," WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Beef Hormones].
3. Id. "Likewise, the ability of any Member to enact measures which are
intended to protect not consumer health but other consumer concerns was not
addressed. In this regard, we are aware that in some countries,... voluntary
labeling schemes operate .... ." Id. 8.278.
4. Id.
5. Organic Food Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C.A. § 6501-22 (West Supp.
1998) [hereinafter OFPA].
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The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Con-
gress the power to pass legislation such as the OFPA. 6 Gener-
ally, such laws must only pass a rational-basis test to be
constitutional. 7 However, laws affecting international trade
must also meet the requirements set forth under GATT and its
side agreements. For example, a domestic law could violate
GATT by acting as a protectionist measure for the domestic in-
dustry.8 In addition to challenges directly under GATT, sani-
tary measures (which include laws or regulations concerning
food) are subject to scrutiny under the Agreement on the Appli-
cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment).9 The SPS Agreement requires that, where possible,
standards for sanitary measures be in accord with applicable in-
ternationally accepted standards. In the absence of such stan-
dards, the SPS Agreement requires that standards be
scientifically supported.' 0 Technical regulations that are not
sanitary measures, such as labeling, packaging or marking stan-
dards, are covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement)." The TBT Agreement prohibits a
country from using its technical standards to create unnecessary
obstacles to trade. The SPS and TBT Agreements work in tan-
dem with GATT to prevent impermissible trade barriers.
This Note examines the OFPA and its potential conflict with
GATT, the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. Part I out-
lines the history of the OFPA, its purposes and its goals. It ex-
plores the difference between organic and conventionally
produced food with an eye to the defining characteristics of or-
ganic food and whether the differences are related to the end
product or the production methods. It also discusses the United
States' primary food safety law, the Federal Food, Drug, and
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Richard E. Levy & Stephen
R. McAllister, Defining the Roles of the National and State Governments in The
American Federal System: A Symposium, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 971 (1997) (dis-
cussing the history and theory of federalism, as well as its place in the political
process).
7. For a treatment of the standard of review for Congress' Commerce
Clause power, see generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See
also Levy & McAllister, supra note 6.
8. GATT art. I.
9. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-4 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
10. See infra notes 115-24 (explaining the SPS standard requiring a scien-
tific basis for sanitary measures).
11. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-
AJA-6 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
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Cosmetic Act, 12 and its interaction with the OFPA. Part II de-
tails relevant provisions from GATT, the SPS Agreement and
the TBT Agreement. GATT Articles III and XI are the main pro-
visions under which a complaining party may challenge the
OFPA. Part II also discusses GATT Article XX general defenses.
Part III scrutinizes the OFPA under GATT, the SPS Agreement,
and the TBT Agreement. This Note concludes that the OFPA
could not likely survive a challenge brought under GATT, the
SPS or TBT Agreements, particularly when a complaining party
has an equivalent organic program which the United States does
not recognize under the OFPA.
I. THE OFPA AND ORGANIC FOODS
A. THE ORGANIC FOOD PRODUCTION ACT OF 1990
Prior to passage of the OFPA, the organic food industry
tried to implement a self-regulated national organic labeling
program.13 Efforts by organizers failed because the various fac-
tions could not decide on a coherent set of standards. 14 Failing
at self-organization, the organic groups resorted to lobbying
Congress, which responded by passing the OFPA. 15 The pur-
poses advanced by Congress for the OFPA were: "(1) to establish
national standards governing the marketing of certain agricul-
tural products as organically produced products; (2) to assure
consumers that organic products meet a consistent standard;
and (3) to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed
food that is organically produced."' 6
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West
1972 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter FDCA].
13. Kyle W. Lathrop, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation
of Organic Food Labeling, 16 J. CORP. L. 885, 885-89 (1991).
14. Id.
15. Id. See also OFPA, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990).
16. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (West Supp. 1998). The general legislative history of
the bill supports the general purposes set forth ante, but the record also shows
additional purposes, including environmental stewardship and regulation of
production methods. See S. REP. No. 101-357, at 640-90 (1990). There is a
plethora of evidence supporting the argument that organic farming reduces the
toll on the environment compared to conventional methods. For a treatment of
this issue, see generally John Bell Clark, Impact and Analysis of the U.S. Fed-
eral Organic Food Production Act of 1990 with Particular Reference to the Great
Lakes, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 323 (1995). The difference between the stated pur-
pose in § 6501(1) of the OFPA (governing marketing standards) and the regula-
tion of methods defined as "organic" is subtle but important. Because there is
no national or international standard defining exactly what constitutes "or-
ganic," Congress in essence gave the Secretary of Agriculture a blank slate on
which to draft the meaning of the term. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6518 (West Supp. 1998)
1998] 401
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Congress' concern about misleading or fraudulent labeling
in the organic food market was one reason behind the OFPA. 17
Fraudulent labeling is attractive because consumers are willing
to pay premium prices for organic food.' 8 One reason for the
higher prices on organic food is the higher cost of organic farm-
ing. Another reason is purely market-driven: the demand for
organic products is greater than the supply. Concern over the
incentive to mislabel food as organic, combined with the rate of
growth in the organic food market, spurred Congress to enact
the OFPA.19 Congress delegated the authority to promulgate fi-
nal rules on organic labeling to the Secretary of Agriculture.
When the final rules go into effect in mid-1998, the OFPA will
regulate production, marketing and labeling of organic food.20
When the OFPA was passed, twenty-two states had existing
laws regulating organic food labeling.21 Congress included a
provision in the OFPA which allowed states to have parallel,
more stringent regulations as long as they are consistent with
the OFPA and do not interfere with interstate trade of organic
(allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint a board to develop standards
for substances used in organic production). This in effect allows the Secretary
to regulate the production methods that can be used. Since the board advising
the Secretary consists of members from the domestic organic food industry, it is
highly probable that the final rules will favor the domestic methods.
17. S. REP. No. 101-357, at 640-90.
18. See Suzanne Vaupel, Advising Producers of Organic Crops, 2 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 137, 138 (1997) (indicating how organic food sales grew at a rate of
more than 20% annually from 1989-1995). Consumers generally pay 30% to
75% for organic food compared to the same non-organic produce. Id.
19. Id. at 138-39. Similar market growth is being observed globally, and as
a consequence foreign countries are devoting more land to organic production.
See, e.g., Hanoi to Expand Organically Grown Vegetable Output, ASIA PULSE,
Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13561078 (showing projected growth of or-
ganic farmland from 300 to 2,000 hectares); Argentina Organic Food Output
Depends on Free Trade, Dow JONES COMMODITIES SERVICE, Aug. 24, 1997, (ex-
plaining Argentina's plan to increase land allotted to organic agriculture from
5,500 to 346,978 hectares).
20. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6501. See also supra note 16.
21. Lathrop, supra note 13, at 891 (listing the state regulations in effect
when the OFPA passed in 1990).
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produce not carrying additional labels. 22 As a result, numerous
states will retain laws regulating organic food labeling.23
The OFPA allows certified organic operations to use a
USDA "certified organic" label on food products. The label guar-
antees that the end product was grown and/or produced in ac-
cordance with national organic standards. 24 "Certified organic,"
as used in the OFPA, means that a product was grown or
processed in a specified manner. 25 Attainment of "organic" sta-
tus does not depend on the characteristics of the end product,
but rather on whether production meets OFPA standards. 26
The OFPA standards are set by the Secretary of Agriculture
with the assistance of the National Organic Standards Board
(NOSB). 2 7 The NOSB is comprised of four organic farmers, two
organic handlers, one retailer of organic products, three environ-
mentalists, two consumer interest advocates, one scientist and
22. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6507(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1998). See also Lathrop, supra
note 13, at 885-86 (explaining the potential practical effects of allowing parallel
state labeling requirements). The states must allow organic food meeting the
OFPA standards to carry the USDA certified organic label, regardless of the
state of origin. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6507(b)(2). But the states may allow their own
certified organic labels to be affixed to the same food carrying the USDA label
as long as it is not discriminatory to organic produce from other states. Id.
23. For examples of the parallel state organic labeling laws, see generally
the California Organic Foods Act of 1990, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 110810 (1996 & Supp. 1998); the Oregon Organic Food Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 616.406 (1996). The use of additional state labels may have little practical
significance because the state standards, by law, must be equal to or higher
than the OFPA requirements. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6507(b)(1). The USDA label alone
should give consumers confidence they are buying certified organic food. How-
ever, a potentially discriminatory situation arises when the state labels carry a
perception of having requirements that produce superior quality food compared
to those labeled by the USDA. This would be inconsistent with the OFPA's
purpose. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6507(b)(2)(B). While this issue needs to examined, it will
not be ripe until the OFPA regulations are in effect and the effects of state la-
bels which frustrate the purposes of the OFPA are litigated. See Lathrop, supra
note 13.
24. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6505(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998). "A label affixed, or other
market information provided, in accordance with paragraph (1) may indicate
that the agricultural product meets Department of Agriculture standards for
organic production and may incorporate the Department of Agriculture seal."
Id.
25. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6502(14) (West Supp. 1998). "The term 'organically pro-
duced' means an agricultural product that is produced and handled in accord-
ance with this chapter." Id.
26. Id.
27. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6518(a) (West Supp. 1998). "The Secretary shall establish
a National Organic Standards Board (in accordance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act) ... to assist in the development of standards for substances to
be used in organic production and to advise the Secretary on any other aspects
of the implementation of this chapter." Id.
1998]
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one certifying agent.28 A major function of the NOSB is to deter-
mine what substances, such as pesticides and fertilizers, will be
permitted for use in organic operations. 2 9 The NOSB, in making
such determinations, is required to consider possible adverse
human and environmental effects.30
In December 1997, nearly eight years after the OFPA's pas-
sage, the USDA issued the proposed rules for organic certifica-
tion.3 1 While the rules were to be open for public comment until
March 1998,32 strong initial opposition to some of the permitted
practices delayed any final action until the summer of 1998.3 3
For example, one proposed rule would allow beef fed up to
twenty percent non-organic food to carry the "certified organic"
label.34 Opposition arose from traditional organic groups who
felt the proposed rules were inconsistent with current organic
practices.35 While the resistance comes from many factions, one
theme is clear: the concerns are driven more by consumer pref-
erences than by any other factor.3 6
Another area that remains unsettled is how countries ex-
porting organic food to the United States will fare under the
OFPA. Foreign programs with organic labeling requirements
equivalent to or more strict than the OFPA rules should be
granted the USDA label with little objection. 37 The Secretary of
Agriculture can allow the sale of imported products as organic if
28. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6518(b).
29. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6518(a). ["The] National Organic Standards Board ...
[shall] assist in the development of standards for substances to be used in or-
ganic production." Id.
30. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6518()(1). "In establishing the proposed National List [of
substances approved for or banned from organic operations] ... the Board shall
... review available information... concerning the potential for adverse human
and environmental effects of substances considered for inclusion in the pro-
posed National List." Id.
31. Proposed Rules, National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,850 (1997).
32. Id.
33. Organic Groups' Outcry Compels USDA to Delay Action on Labeling
Rules, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Feb. 7, 1998, at 10A. The Secretary of Agricul-
ture extended the comment period to April 30, 1998. Id. As a result, the earli-
est any rules will be in effect is summer of 1998.
34. Proposed Rules, National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. at 65,942.
35. Organic Groups' Outcry Compels USDA to Delay Action on Labeling
Rules, supra note 32. The organic groups also complained that the proposed
rules permitted the use of synthetic pesticides and irradiation to kill bacteria on
food. Id. Further, the groups complained that the Secretary of Agriculture had
ignored many of the NOSB proposals. Id.
36. See, e.g., Fed Plan Threatens Organic Agriculture, PRESS DEMOCRAT,
Jan. 18, 1998, at G1; What Food is Organic? Federal Rules Decide, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 1998, at A7.
37. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6505(b) (West Supp. 1998).
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the "production and handling is at least equivalent to the re-
quirements [of the OFPA] ."38
The meaning of "equivalent" is yet to be determined, but if
the controversy over the final rules is any indication, American
organic interest groups will likely lobby to ensure that recog-
nized "equivalent" foreign programs do not permit any of the
practices that they disfavor. A recent case, Mississippi Poultry
Association. v. Madigan,39 illustrates that the meaning of
"equivalent" will most likely be narrowly construed. At issue in
Madigan was the meaning of foreign standards "at least equal
to" U.S. standards. 40 The Madigan court read the language to
be a statutory requirement of identical treatment. 41
The requirement that foreign programs be "at least
equivalent to" the OFPA rules is potentially ambiguous. For-
eign organic programs with standards slightly lower than the
OFPA may not be recognized. If so, the exporting countries may
challenge the OFPA, alleging that it acts to unfairly protect the
U.S. organic industry. Additionally, even if a foreign organic
program is recognized under the federal standard, its organic
food may not qualify for a state label if the state's requirements
are more stringent than the OFPA.4 2 If foreign programs with
lower standards than the OFPA requirements are deemed
"equivalent" to the OFPA, state labels could become the de facto
minimum standard acceptable to organic food consumers. The
eventual result could be that foreign organic producers alone
would carry the USDA label. U.S. consumers would then only
purchase food carrying a state organic label. 43
38. Id.
39. 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 295 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 454 (1994)). "Congress also addressed the
issue of foreign standards. Under § 17(d) of the [Poultry Products Inspection
Act] PPIA, Congress directed the Secretary to require imported poultry prod-
ucts to be subject to the same... standards applied to products produced in the
United States." Id.
41. Id. at 308.
42. 7. U.S.C.A. § 6507(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). "A State organic certifica-
tion program established under subsection (a) of this section may contain more
restrictive requirements governing the organic certification of farms and han-
dling operations and the production and handling of agricultural products that
are to be sold or labeled as organically produced under this chapter than are
contained in the program established by the Secretary." Id.
43. But this would contravene the requirement that the parallel state la-
bels do not make claims of superiority beyond the USDA labels. See generally
Lathrop, supra note 13.
1998]
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B. DISTINGUISHING ORGANIC FROM NON-ORGANIC FOOD
For the purpose of analyzing the OFPA under GATT and its
side agreements, it is important to determine what makes or-
ganic food different from non-organic food. The question to be
answered is whether the end result or the production method
makes food "organic."44 The OFPA contains no language defin-
ing "organic" in terms of the end product produced.45 The legis-
lative history of the OFPA supports defining "organic" in terms
of the process/production method rather than product character-
istics. 46 Under the OFPA, the primary distinction between or-
ganically produced and conventionally produced food is that the
former is produced without synthetic substances. 47
Many consumers believe that organic food is healthier than
other alternatives, although consumer preference for organic
food is not unanimously driven by this belief.48 Available stud-
ies do not tend to support the perception that organic food is
healthier for consumption.49 The link between organic food and
44. While this distinction is somewhat tautological, it is important because
categorizing the difference between organic and non-organic food determines
how the OFPA is analyzed under relevant GATT provisions.
45. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6502 (West Supp. 1998). This section defines organically
produced food as "an agricultural product that is produced and handled in ac-
cordance with [the OFPAI." Id. § 6502(14).
46. S. REP. No. 101-357, at 640-90 (basing criteria set by the National Or-
ganic Standards Board (NOSB) on whether the practice caused environmental
problems). The Committee report states "[tihis legislation does not attempt to
make scientific judgments about whether organically produced food is more
healthful, nutritious, or flavorful than conventionally produced food." Id. at
642. See also Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Differentiating Food
Products: Organic Labeling Provisions Facilitate Consumer Choice, 1 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 30, 41 (1996) (explaining why organic foods cannot claim superior
health benefits compared to conventionally produced food).
47. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6504 (West Supp. 1998). "To be sold or labeled as ... or-
ganically produced ...an agricultural product shall-(1) have been produced
and handled without the use of synthetic chemicals, except as otherwise pro-
vided [... and].., not be produced on land to which any prohibited substances
... have been applied during the 3 years immediately preceding the harvest of
the agricultural products." Id.
48. Lathrop, supra note 13, at 890. The demand for organic food is driven
by two factions. Id. The first group consists of those concerned with the effects
of traditional farming methods that rely on chemicals. Id. They support or-
ganic farming because they favor sustainable agricultural practices that are not
as destructive to the environment as the traditional chemical-based practices.
Id. The public perceives, and studies support this view, that organic farming is
environmentally safe. Id. The second group consists of consumers who believe
that organic food is a superior health alternative. Id.
49. Centner & Lathrop, supra note 46, at 41 (explaining why organic foods
cannot claim superior health benefits compared to conventionally produced
food).
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greater consumer health is based on the consumer's belief that,
because synthetic substances are not used in growing or produc-
tion, organic products are free from residual pesticides and con-
taminants. 50  Congress recognized that consumers define
organic food by the production methods rather than the end
products and thus based the OFPA standards for organic food on
the former. 51
In fact, the OFPA does not guarantee that organic food is
free from pesticides or other contaminants. The OFPA does not
even require organic food to be residue- or pesticide-free. Certi-
fying an operation as organic is not tantamount to certifying the
end products are residue-free, 52 which can lead to some anoma-
lous results. For example, farmers using conventional methods
may be able to produce residue-free products, but cannot carry
the "certified organic" label. 53 Conversely, farmers whose opera-
tions are organically certified will be able to use the USDA label,
but may not be producing residue-free products. 54
Because the OFPA standards are formulated in terms of the
processing and production methods used, rather than end prod-
uct quality, the question arises whether the OFPA should be
classified as a health or safety measure under the applicable in-
ternational trade agreements. 55 One factor weighing against
classification of the OFPA as a health or safety measure is that
50. Id.
51. Because the process is certified and not the product, the products may
not be residue-free because of the naturally occurring concentration of prohib-
ited substances. S. REP. No. 101-357, at 640-90. Thus, the USDA label is not a
guarantee that organic products are residue free. Id. In fact, the Committee
considering the OFPA recognized that pesticide-free or residue-free food is not
the equivalent of organically-produced food. Id. The OFPA codified this differ-
ence in 7 U.S.C.A. § 6511(c)(2)(B) (West 1998) (allowing residue on food if it is
unavoidable due to background concentration of a substance).
52. See supra note 51.
53. Under the OFPA, it is the process, not the end result, that is certified
by the label. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6505 (West 1998).
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
55. Two points are in order here. First, there is an absolute absence in the
legislative history that the OFPA is a measure aimed at the health or safety of
consumers. See supra note 46. However, most consumers prefer organic prod-
ucts exactly because the products are perceived as safer, and therefore, health-
ier. Centner & Lathrop, supra note 46, at 41. Second, the reason organic food is
perceived to be safer than conventional food is because of the absence of pesti-
cides. Id. But pesticide levels are already regulated by the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1972 & Supp. 1995). The default
safety level of a pesticide residue is set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
Id. § 346a(b)(4). The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a joint Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) body re-
sponsible for international food standards. Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling
1998]
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the United States already has a food safety standard, namely
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).56 The
FDCA sets the maximum safe levels of pesticides and other con-
taminants allowable in food sold for consumption.5 7 The FDCA
seeks to harmonize U.S. food safety standards with the rest of
the world by adopting the Codex Alimentarius Commission's
standards.58
As a health or safety measure, the OFPA would be superflu-
ous to the FDCA. Additionally, it is difficult to categorize the
OFPA as a health or safety measure because compliance is only
voluntary. A measure truly aimed at protecting the health and
safety of consumers would logically require compliance. It is im-
portant to address these concerns because the classification of a
health measure as such determines whether it is challenged
under GATT, the SPS, or the TBT Agreements. Characteriza-
tion also determines which defenses can be raised in support of a
given regulation.
II. CHALLENGING REGULATIONS AFFECTING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: GATT, THE SPS
AGREEMENT, AND THE TBT
AGREEMENT
A. GATT
Two related purposes of GATT are to reduce barriers to in-
ternational trade and to eliminate protective treatment of do-
mestic goods.59 GATT especially disfavors national laws that
protect domestic products at the expense of imports. 60 Exam-
ples of domestic protection include regulations that treat domes-
tic products favorably in comparison to imports or import bans
on competing products. Two sections of GATT work in tandem
to prohibit discrimination against imports. Article III, the na-
tional treatment clause, requires that internal taxes or regula-
Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference in the
Growth Hormone Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 635 (1997).
56. FDCA, supra note 55.
57. Id. § 346a(a). If a pesticide is used in growing food, the FDCA limits
the amount that may be present in the end product to a scientifically deter-
mined safe amount. Id. The effect is that if any pesticide residues on food ex-
ceed a safe threshold limit, a limit established by scientific methods, the food
cannot be lawfully sold for consumption. Id.
58. Id. § 346a(b)(4) (requiring adoption of Codex standards unless reasons
exist for departure from the standards).
59. GATT preamble.
60. GATT arts. III and XI.
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tions cannot act to protect domestic production or products. 61
Article XI is a general prohibition against quantitative restric-
tions or import quotas.62 The difference between Articles III
and XI is that Article III applies to measures that affect im-
ported products and Article XI applies to measures which affect
the actual importation of products. 63 Together, Articles III and
XI seek to make all protection of domestic products transparent
and in the form of tariffs. 64
A regulation that violates either Article III or XI, however,
may still be permitted if it qualifies as one of a limited number of
GATT exceptions. GATT Article XX contains the general excep-
tions that may be invoked to maintain a regulation which other-
wise violates GATT. 65 The SPS and TBT Agreements, enacted
during the 1994 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 66 have
significantly restricted the exercise of Article XX defenses for
health and safety measures. 67 The SPS Agreement requires
that sanitary and phytosanitary measures have a scientifically
supported and verifiable basis.68 Similarly, the TBT Agreement
requires that packaging, marking or labeling requirements do
not create unnecessary barriers to international trade or unjus-
tifiably or arbitrarily discriminate against imports.69
1. GATT Article III:4
Article III of GATT is the national treatment clause. It re-
quires that a country treat imported products "no less favorably"
61. GATT art. III.
62. GATT art. XI.
63. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, ch.
11.1 (1995) (discussing the differences and interrelationship between Articles
III and XI).
64. Panel on "Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review
Act," Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 157; JACKSON, supra note 63,
at 423.
65. GATT art. XX. The specific Article XX provision pertinent to analyzing
the OFPA is Article XX(b), regarding the health and safety of human life. Id.
66. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
67. See generally Julie Cromer, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:
What They Could Mean for Health and Safety Regulations Under GATT, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 557 (1995) (analyzing the effect of the SPS Agreement on
health regulations).
68. SPS Agreement art. 2.2.
69. TBT Agreement preamble.
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than it treats domestic products.70 Article 111:4 deals with the
treatment of products and the conditions affecting their sale.7'
Internal regulations violate Article III:4 if they treat products of
foreign origin less favorably than like products of domestic ori-
gin with respect to the sale, purchase or use of the products.72
For example, Article III:4 can be violated when a government
gives a purchaser a rebate for buying a domestically produced
product but does not give a rebate for buying the imported like
product. 73
A violation of GATT Article III:4 may also occur if there are
procedural differences in the way foreign and domestic products
are treated. 74 For example, a WTO Panel found a violation of
Article III:4 where patent infringement claims against domestic
products were subject to different procedures than claims
against imported products. Infringement claims against domes-
tic products could be brought in either the federal district court
or the United States International Court of Trade (USITC).75
Claims of patent infringement against imported products could
only be brought in the USITC. 76 The Panel concluded that the
procedural difference violated Article III:4 because imported
products were treated less favorably than "like" domestic
products. 77
A violation of GATT Article III:4 may also be established if
the regulation represents disguised protection of a domestic
product or industry. 78 Disguised discrimination occurs when a
70. GATT art. 111:4. For an in-depth discussion of Article 111:4, see JACK-
SON, supra note 63, ch. 11.
71. GATT art. III:4. "The products of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale [or] offering for
sale .... " Id.
72. Id.
73. See Panel on "Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural
Machinery," Oct. 23, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (1959) [hereinafter
Agricultural Machinery].
74. See Panel Report on "United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930," Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 [hereinafter Section
337].
75. Id. [ 5.4.
76. Id.
77. Id. [ 5.20.
78. See, e.g., Section 337, supra note 74, 7 5.13-.14. For example, if a gov-
ernment develops a set of standards to govern a product, it will do so in a way
that favors methods or distinctions used by the domestic industry. If the meas-
ures are sanitary or phytosanitary, Article 2 of the SPS Agreement governs the
regulation. If it is not a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, then the measure
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facially neutral regulation adversely affects imported products.
This type of protection is difficult to challenge under Article III:4
because health, safety or environmental reasons are often ad-
vanced in support of the regulation. The SPS and TBT Agree-
ments address these areas, and are better vehicles with which to
challenge disguised discrimination. 79
a. The Product/Process Distinction Under Article III:4
Article III:4 does not apply to regulations based on the pro-
cess by which a product is made or manufactured.80 The lan-
guage of Article III:4 applies only to regulations affecting
"products."81 If the regulation does not affect the quality, safety,
or features of the end product, it must logically relate instead to
the process and is not covered by Article 111.82 Given Article
III's exclusion of process methods, classification as a product or
process regulation takes on increased importance.
The Tuna/Dolphin case aptly illustrates the process/product
distinction.8 3 In Tuna/Dolphin, the United States banned im-
portation of tuna harvested by methods resulting in the inciden-
tal deaths of dolphins.8 4 The WTO Panel deciding the dispute
noted that Article III:4 only addresses regulations relating to
products, not the processes by which products are created.8 5
The Panel concluded that Article III:4 did not apply to the regu-
lation in question because the regulation distinguished tuna
products based on the process by which they were harvested,
is covered by the TBT Agreement. Article 2.8 of the TBT requires that stan-
dards be "based on product requirements in terms of performance rather than
design or descriptive characteristics." This issue was raised in the Beef Hor-
mones dispute, but since all parties agreed that the measures were sanitary,
scrutiny of the issue under the TBT did not occur. Beef Hormones, supra note
2, 8.32. A claim for disguised discrimination is difficult to prove. See JACKSON,
supra note 63, at 522.
79. "Members shall ensure that their sanitary ... measures do not arbi-
trarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or simi-
lar conditions prevail .... Sanitary ... measures shall not be applied in a
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade."
SPS Agreement 2.3. ["Measures... should not be] applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination... or a
disguised restriction on international trade .... " TBT Agreement preamble.
80. GATT art. III:4.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
83. United States-Restriction on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (panel report not adopted by the GATT Con-
tracting Parties) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin].
84. Id. [ 5.1-.4.
85. Id. 5.10.
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rather than the product itself8 6 The Panel further found that,
even if the regulation could be construed as affecting the sale of
tuna as a product, it still violated Article III:4 because it treated
imports less favorably than "like" domestic products.8 7
b. Analysis of an Article III:4 Claim
Analysis of a challenged regulation under GATT Article
III:4 follows a straightforward procedure. To find a violation,
the measure must first be determined to be an internal regula-
tion.88 Second, if the law is an internal regulation, it must affect
the sale, purchase or use of the product.8 9 Third, the products
affected must be "like" products with those domestic products
which the measure in question protects.90 Finally, if an Article
III:4 violation is found, the offending party can attempt to justify
the regulation with GATT defenses. 91
An internal regulation is defined as any governmental ac-
tion that applies to all goods, whether foreign or domestic. 92 A
regulation may be considered "internal" even if it is enforced at
the border.93 For example, a border regulation barring the im-
port of a good is analyzed as an internal measure under GATT
Article III:4 if the regulation affects the sale of products.94 Re-
call also that the regulation must relate to the product as a prod-
uct rather than to the production method. 95
86. Id. 5.11.
87. Id. 5.15.
88. GATT art. III:4; see also Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 83, 5.6-.9; JACK-
SON, supra note 63, at 502.
89. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 83, 5.6-.9.
90. GATT art. 111:4.
91. GATT art. XX.
92. Section 337, supra note 74, 5.10.
93. See GATT ad art. III. "Any internal... law, regulation or requirement
... which applies to an imported product and a like domestic product and is...
enforced ... at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded
as .. .internal ... and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III."
Id.; see also Section 337, supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (establishing
that violations of GATT Article 111:4 may occur if there are procedural differ-
ences in the way foreign and domestic products are treated).
94. GATT ad art. III.
95. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 83. The product/process distinction was
solidified in the Tuna/Dolphin case. Id. However, that final Panel decision was
never adopted, partly because Mexico, the complaining party against the
United States, was negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement at
the time. See JACKSON, supra note 63, at 584. It is assumed for this Note that
any similar future disputes concerning a regulation affecting a process and not
a product's qualities would be analyzed in the same manner.
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Whether a regulation affects the sale of a product is broadly
interpreted under Article 111:4. This interpretation encom-
passes more than just direct regulation of sales. A sale is af-
fected if the regulation directly governs the conditions of the
purchase or sale, or when it may "adversely modify the condi-
tions of competition between the domestic and imported prod-
ucts on the internal market."96
For a difference in treatment between foreign and domestic
products to be actionable, the products must be "like" products
within the meaning of Article III:4. The determination of "like"
is done on a case-by-case basis.97 Factors in determining
whether products are "like" include consumer preferences, tariff
classification, end use, and physical properties and characteris-
tics.98 If an imported product is given less favorable treatment
than the "like" domestic product, a prima facie violation of Arti-
cle III:4 is established. 99 A party can defend a measure violat-
ing GATT Article III:4 by raising an affirmative defense under
Article XX.100 If the defense is that the regulation is a sanitary
measure, the regulation faces additional scrutiny under the SPS
Agreement.
2. GATT Article XI
GATT Article XI generally prohibits import quotas or re-
strictions on products. 10 1 Because it is, effectively, a quota re-
striction limiting imports to zero, a complete import ban on a
product is also considered a quota restriction. While GATT
strongly disfavors quota restrictions, it exempts limited catego-
ries within Article XI. 10 2 Quota restrictions may also be justi-
fied under Article XX. 10 3 With respect to the OFPA, it is
96. See Agricultural Machinery, supra note 73, at 160.
97. Panel Report on "United States-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline," WT/DS2/R at 6.9 (appealed) (Jan.17, 1996).
98. Panel on "Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages," Nov. 10, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th
Supp.) at 83.
99. See Section 337, supra note 74, 5.10-.12.
100. Id. 5.9.
101. See GATT art. XI. "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained ... on the impor-
tation of any product. . . ." Id.
102. GATT Article XI:2(c)(i), which provides exceptions for certain agricul-
tural situations, is the exception most relevant to the OFPA. But, the excep-
tions allowed have been very narrowly construed. See infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text.
103. See GATT art. XX.
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unclear whether the denial of a "certified organic" label to an
equivalent foreign organic program constitutes an import re-
striction within the meaning of Article XI.
Article XI exempts a limited number of import restrictions
from its coverage. 104 Article XI:2(c)(i), for example, exempts im-
port bans on agricultural products.'0 5 The United States could
assert that this exception covers the OFPA. This exception, how-
ever, has been narrowly construed by a WTO Panel, which con-
cluded that a party invoking the exemption must meet seven
criteria: (i) only import restrictions, not prohibitions, are per-
mitted; (ii) the restriction must be on an agricultural product;
(iii) the government must restrict domestic supplies of the prod-
uct; (iv) restrictions must be imposed on "like" products; (v) im-
port restrictions must be necessary for enforcement of the
domestic restriction; (vi) public notice must be given; and (vii)
import restrictions must not reduce the proportional market
share of each importing country. 1 6 Because of these many cri-
teria, it is difficult to defend an import restriction under GATT
Article XI:2(c)(i). 1 7
3. GATT Article XX
Article XX of GATT contains general exceptions for regula-
tions that otherwise violate GATT. Exceptions include regula-
tions to protect, inter alia, public morals, health or safety of
human life, and conservation of exhaustible resources.10 8 To
qualify under an exception, regulations cannot be applied arbi-
trarily, cannot unjustifiably discriminate and cannot constitute
a disguised trade restriction. 109 The United States would likely
argue that the OFPA qualifies under Article XX(b), which ex-
empts measures "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health."110 The term "necessary," as used in Article
104. GATT art XI:2. "The provisions of this Article shall not extend to the
following [exceptions] ... ." Id.
105. GATT art. XI:2(c)(i). "Import restrictions on any agricultural... pro-
duct . . . necessary to the enforcement of [a] governmental measure[] which
operate[s]: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product, or, if there
is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product
for which the imported product can be directly substituted.. . ." Id.
106. Panel Report on "Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricul-
tural Products," Mar. 21, 1988, GAT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 [hereinafter
Japan-Agricultural Products].
107. Id. 3.2.2; see also JACKSON, supra note 63, at 355-56.
108. GATT art. XX.
109. Id.
110. GATT art. XX(b).
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XX(b), has been interpreted as requiring all GATT-consistent
measures to have failed. 111
B. THE SPS AGREEMENT
In addition to facing scrutiny under GATT, import restric-
tions related to health and safety measures classified as "sani-
tary" must be examined under the SPS Agreement. The SPS
Agreement was passed during the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions. 112 The SPS Agreement does not address any particular
sanitary or phytosanitary measure. 113 Instead, it establishes a
number of general requirements and procedures to ensure that
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are in fact intended to pro-
tect against the risk asserted, and are not simply disguised
trade barriers. 11 4 The force of the SPS Agreement lies in its re-
quirement that sanitary and phytosanitary measures be based
on scientific principles. 115 Article 2.2 establishes the general ob-
ligation that sanitary or phytosanitary measures be "applied
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health, [be] based on scientific principles and [not be]
maintained against scientific evidence, except as provided in Ar-
ticle [5.7].".116 Further, Article 2.3 requires that measures shall
not "constitute a ... restriction on international trade."' 17
111. See Section 337, supra note 74, 5.26. See generally Tuna/Dolphin,
supra note 83, [ 5.22-.29 (analyzing Article XX(b) in light of the parties'
arguments).
112. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of
the President, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administra-
tive Action, available in 1994 WL 761638 (G.A.T.T.) at *1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See SPS Agreement art. 2.2. A sanitary or phytosanitary measure is
defined as one "protect[ing] human... life or health... from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, bever-
ages or feedstuffs." Id. annex A, 1(b). This definition is incorporated into the
main SPS Agreement. Id. art. 1.2.
116. SPS Agreement art. 2.2. Article 5.7 reads:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member
may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the ba-
sis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary
measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members
shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
SPS Agreement art. 5.7.
117. SPS Agreement art. 2.3.
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The SPS Agreement seeks to internationally harmonize
SPS measures. 118 The SPS Agreement seeks to accomplish this
goal by encouraging parties to adopt sanitary measures based on
international standards. 119 Sanitary measures based on inter-
national standards are presumptively valid under the SPS
Agreement and GATT. 120
Often no international standards for a particular sanitary
regulation exist. In such instances, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agree-
ment allows a Member to adopt provisional measures.' 2 ' Article
5.7 requires, however, that the Member obtain information to
conduct an objective risk assessment within a reasonable
time.122 A member may also adopt measures which are more
stringent than the international standards,1 23 but the higher
standards must comply with the SPS Agreement. 124
A complaining party challenging a regulation under the
SPS Agreement does not first have to establish that the measure
118. SPS Agreement art. 3.1. Article 3.1 reads, "To harmonize sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base
their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international standards, guide-
lines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in
this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3." Id. Article 4.1 further seeks
reciprocity of recognition between members whose equivalent measures accom-
plish the same levels of sanitary protection:
Members shall accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of
other Members as equivalent, even if those measures differ from their
own or from those used by other Members trading in the same product,
if the government of the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to
the government of the importing country that its measures achieve the
importing Member's appropriate level of S&P protection. For this pur-
pose, the Agreement requires that the exporting Member provide rea-
sonable access to the importing Member for inspection, testing and
other relevant procedures.
SPS Agreement art. 4.1.
119. SPS Agreement art. 3.2. Article 3.2 provides that "[slanitary or
phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines
or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provi-
sions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994." Id.
120. SPS Agreement, annex A(3)(a). ["The] international standards, guide-
lines and recommendations . . . [for food safety are] established by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission on food additives, veterinary drug and pesticide resi-
dues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guide-
lines of hygienic practice." Id. Thus, if a sanitary measure such as the OFPA
were based on the guidelines of the Codex Alimentarius, it would be presump-
tively valid under both the SPS Agreement and GATT. See Beef Hormones,
supra note 2, 2.11.
121. SPS Agreement art. 5.7.
122. Id.
123. SPS Agreement art. 3.3.
124. Id.; see also Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 8.248-.249.
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violates GATT. 125 For example, the United States successfully
used the SPS Agreement to challenge the European Union's im-
port ban of hormone-treated beef.126 The United States and the
European Union agreed that the ban was a sanitary measure. 27
The United States complained that the measure violated the
SPS Agreement because it lacked scientific support. 2 The
United States argued that the ban should be examined under
the SPS Agreement and that a showing of a GATT violation
should not be required.' 29 The WTO Panel agreed, giving the
SPS Agreement independent significance from GATT.1 30 The
Panel then analyzed the ban and concluded it violated the SPS
Agreement. 13'
In Beef Hormones, the European Union defended the ban by
raising the Precautionary Principle. 13 2 The Precautionary Prin-
ciple states that in cases of uncertain or unknown health or
safety risks it is better to err on the side of safety by regulating
too stringently, rather than too leniently. 13 This approach is
warranted, for example, when there is a concern that potential
damage from a substance may not be known until long after it
has been ingested.' 3 4
Invoking the Precautionary Principle, the European Union
claimed that the unknown, long-term effects of hormones justi-
fied a complete ban in order to protect consumers. 3 5 To bolster
its claim, the European Union pointed to the Thalidomide and
DES disasters as historical examples of substances originally
considered safe but which ultimately caused serious health
problems.' 36 The Beef Hormones Panel rejected the Precaution-
125. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, [ 8.41. The WTO Panel found that
"there is no requirement ... that a prior violation of a GATT provision need be
established before the SPS Agreement applies." Id.
126. Id. IT 8.16-.19.
127. Id. 8.22. See also supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discuss-





132. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 4.202-.207.
133. See id. [ 4.202-.203. For a treatment of the Precautionary Principle
and its relationship with international trade law, see generally D. FREESTONE &
E. HEY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1995).
134. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, [ 4.203.
135. "The European Communities stressed that the difference in degree of
regulation... was due to the greater attachment of the European Communities
to use the precautionary principle." Id.
136. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 55, at 626-28.
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ary Principle as an independent defense. 137 It concluded that
the SPS Agreement incorporated the Precautionary Principle
into numerous provisions, including Article 5.7.138 The Beef
Hormones case demonstrates that, even though the Precaution-
ary Principle is incorporated into the SPS Agreement, caution
alone, without scientific support, will not likely support a sani-
tary measure.
C. THE TBT AGREEMENT
The TBT Agreement 139 replaces the Standards Code, which
did not effectively resolve controversies because it lacked a clear
dispute settlement mechanism.140 The TBT Agreement incorpo-
rates specific dispute settlement procedures of the WTO, elimi-
nating this problem.141 The major purpose of the TBT
Agreement is to "ensure [that] technical regulations 142 and stan-
dards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade.'u 43 The TBT Agreement requires that standards are not
"prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to or effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade... and fulfil a le-
gitimate objective." 1' Legitimate objectives include prevention
of deceptive practices, protection of human health and safety,
and protection of the environment. 145
137. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 8.249.
138. Id. 8.157. This finding was affirmed in Report of the Appellate Body,
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Jan. 16, 1998)
253, available in 1998 WL 25520, at *69.
139. TBT Agreement, supra note 11.
140. Id. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, also called the
Standards Code, was adopted during the Tokyo Round of negotiations and sup-
planted by the TBT Agreement during the 1994 Uruguay Round. For example,
the Beef Hormones complaint by the United States was originally brought
under the Standards Code but never resolved under it. See Adrian Halpern,
Comment, The U.S.-E.C. Hormone Beef Controversy and the Standards Code:
Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade, 14
N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 135 (1989).
141. TBT Agreement, supra note 11, 14.
142. A technical regulation is defined as a "[diocument which lays down
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods ....
It may also include.., labeling requirements as they apply to a product, pro-
cess or production method." TBT Agreement, supra note 11, annex 1, 1 1. Le-
gitimate objectives are "national security requirements[; the] prevention of
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety. . . ." Id. 2.2. The
OFPA arguably fulfills a legitimate purpose in that it is aimed at preventing
the deceptive practice of using an organic label on conventionally produced food
in order to sell it for the premium that organic produce commands.
143. TBT Agreement, supra note 11, preamble.
144. Id. art. 2.2.
145. Id.
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The TBT Agreement requires, in addition to fulfilling a le-
gitimate objective, that "wherever appropriate... technical reg-
ulations shall be based on product requirements in terms of
performance rather than design or descriptive characteris-
tics. 14 6 Standards based on the end product characteristics,
rather than process and production methods, are more effective
in preventing countries from creating trade barriers for im-
ported products through technical regulations.147 The scope of
the TBT Agreement is broad; it applies to all industrial and agri-
cultural products. 148 Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations
are not covered by the TBT Agreement because they fall under
the purview of the SPS Agreement. 149 Thus, there exists no con-
flict between the two agreements-they are mutually exclusive.
By working in tandem, the TBT and SPS Agreements seek to
prevent all disguised discrimination imposed by technical
regulations.
A type of regulation the TBT Agreement seeks to prevent is
one intentionally designed to protect or favor a domestic indus-
try.150 To avoid this, the TBT Agreement encourages a country
to base its domestic technical standards on existing interna-
tional standards. 151 When a domestic regulation conforms to in-
ternational standards, it enjoys a presumption of legality under
the TBT Agreement and GATT.15 2 If an international standard
does not exist, the TBT Agreement strongly encourages coun-
tries to participate in the formulation of new standards that can
be applied internationally.I5 3 The TBT Agreement also encour-
146. Id. art. 2.8.
147. See JACKSON, supra note 63, at 538-41.
148. TBT Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.3. Article 1.3 reads: "All prod-
ucts, including industrial and agricultural products, shall be subject to the pro-
visions of this Agreement." Id.
149. Id. art. 1.5. Article 1.5 provides: "The provisions of this Agreement do
not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex A of the
[SPS Agreement]." Id.
150. Id. preamble.
151. Id. art. 2.4. "Where technical regulations are required and relevant in-
ternational standards exist[] . . . Members shall use them, or the relevant parts
of them, as a basis for their technical regulations ... except where such stan-
dards would be[] ... ineffective or inappropriate .... " Id.
152. TBT Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.5.
153. Id. art. 2.6 (requiring Members to play a part in harmonizing interna-
tional technical standards).
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ages GATT members to accept other members' measures if they
adequately fulfill domestic objectives.15 4
In Beef Hormones, the United States challenged the Euro-
pean Union's hormone ban under the TBT Agreement.' 55 The
United States claimed the ban was designed to protect Europe's
domestic beef industry in violation of Article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement. 5 6 The United States asserted the ban was a tech-
nical regulation requiring mandatory process and production
methods related to product characteristics.' 5 7 Because both par-
ties stipulated the ban was a sanitary measure, the TBT issues
in the complaint were not addressed. 58 While jurisprudence in
the area of technical regulations is as yet undeveloped, the TBT
Agreement provides an additional weapon for challenging pro-
cess and production regulations such as the OFPA.'5 9
III. TAKING A BITE OUT OF THE OFPA: CHALLENGES
UNDER GATT, THE SPS AGREEMENT, AND THE
TBT AGREEMENT
The OFPA is ripe for scrutiny under GATT and its side
agreements. The crucial determination is whether a voluntary
labeling program such as the OFPA, which distinguishes be-
tween otherwise-identical end products, is legal under GATT.
An analysis of this kind can proceed along two paths. First, the
OFPA may be viewed as a sanitary measure under an analysis
similar to the one in the Beef Hormones case. 160 A second
method of analysis is to treat the OFPA as a non-sanitary
measure.
A. THE OFPA AS A SANITARY MEASURE
If the OFPA is viewed as a sanitary measure, a challenge to
it can be brought directly under the SPS Agreement because
154. Id. art. 2.7. "Members shall give positive consideration to accepting
equivalent technical regulations . . . provided they are satisfied these regula-
tions adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations." Id.
155. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 4.241. The TBT challenge was in addi-
tion to the challenge under the SPS Agreement.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 8.32.
159. One threshold issue would be whether the OFPA is a product or process
restriction.
160. While the United States has not made any claims heretofore that the
measure is either a sanitary or non-sanitary measure, it could characterize the
OFPA in a way such that it would receive most favorable treatment under the
GATT.
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there is no requirement that another GATT violation first be es-
tablished. 161 As a threshold matter, a party challenging the
OFPA under the SPS Agreement would have to show the regula-
tion is a sanitary measure. 162 While the legislative history of
the OFPA indicates it was not aimed primarily at health or
safety, a complaining party could make a strong case that the
OFPA meets the definition of a sanitary measure found in the
SPS Agreement.
The SPS Agreement defines a "sanitary measure" as one
"protect[ing] human.., life or health ... from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in
foods .... -163 Consumers view the OFPA as guaranteeing re-
duced levels of pesticides and contaminants in organic food.' 64
Further, the OFPA defines the distinguishing characteristic of
organic food as being untreated with synthetic substances. 165
Together, these factors support classifying the OFPA as a sani-
tary measure.
Assuming that the OFPA is defined as a sanitary measure,
a complaining party could argue the OFPA violates the SPS
Agreement in numerous ways. First, Article 3.2 requires that,
where possible, health and safety standards should be set in ac-
cordance with the appropriate international standards. 166 For
food products, the appropriate international standard is the
standard promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius. 167 The
United States, however, already has a food safety measure that
meets the requirement of the SPS Agreement, namely the
FDCA.168 The FDCA incorporates by reference the food safety
standards set by the Codex Alimentarius. 169 In contrast, the
OFPA makes no reference to either the FDCA standards or the
Codex Alimentarius. Since the OFPA incorporates neither the
161. See supra notes 116, 125-27 and accompanying text. If a regulation
violates GATT Articles III or XI, the only possible defense would be under Arti-
cle XX. Any of the Article XX defenses for health or safety reasons would then
have to pass SPS scrutiny.
162. See supra notes 113-16, 126-27 and accompanying text. Similarly, both
parties could agree for purposes of the complaint that the OFPA is a sanitary
measure. This was the situation in Beef Hormones where the United States
and the EC agreed that the hormone ban was a sanitary measure. See supra
notes 126-27.
163. SPS Agreement annex A, 1(b).
164. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
165. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6504 (West Supp. 1993).
166. SPS Agreement art. 3.2.
167. SPS Agreement annex A(3)(a).
168. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Codex Alimentarius standards nor the FDCA standards, it
would appear to violate Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.
In defense, the United States could claim that the OFPA
sets a higher standard than either the FDCA or the Codex Ali-
mentarius, an action permitted under Article 3.3.170 Further,
the United States could argue that, by making participation in
the OFPA voluntary, it is the least trade restrictive method pos-
sible to attain the highest level of protection. A challenging
party could counter that, even if the OFPA does provide a higher
level of protection, it still violates Article 2.2 because the mea-
sure is not "necessary.' 7 1 For example, a party having an or-
ganic program similar to the OFPA may differ slightly by
allowing practices prohibited by the OFPA. 172 If the foreign pro-
gram is not recognized as equivalent to the OFPA, even though
the end-products are virtually identical, the OFPA is most likely
not the least trade-restrictive method possible, and so is not
"necessary" within the meaning of the SPS Agreement. If it can
not meet the standard of being "necessary," the OFPA would vio-
late Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement with respect to the foreign
program.
A second potential challenge to the OFPA is that it violates
Article 2.3 because it acts to protect the domestic production of
organic food. 173 As described above, a foreign organic program
might be virtually equivalent to the OFPA, but be denied certifi-
cation by the USDA due to a minor difference. Such a result
would likely be found to violate Article 2.3.
Failure to recognize the equivalent program could also vio-
late Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement. Article 4.1 requires a
country to accept equivalent foreign measures if the foreign
measures achieve the same level of sanitary protection as the
domestic law. 174 The OFPA could violate Article 4.1 where for-
eign organic measures are substantially equivalent to the OFPA
and achieve the same level of product quality. While the USDA
has not yet ruled on the equivalency of particular foreign pro-
grams, it is likely that American organic consumers will lobby
for denial of certification for foreign programs which permit con-
troversial practices. 175
170. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
171. SPS Agreement art. 2.2.
172. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
173. SPS Agreement art. 2.3.
174. SPS Agreement art. 4.1.
175. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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The process of OFPA rule formulation could lead to the de-
nial of recognition of foreign organic programs. Because the
OFPA standards are set by representatives of the U.S. organic
food industry,176 the standards will likely reflect the practices
and preferences of American consumers. Since consumer prefer-
ences are partly based on environmental concerns, certain prac-
tices acceptable to foreign organic certification programs may be
prohibited by the OFPA. 177 A party denied certification in the
U.S. market because of minor technical differences with the
OFPA would have a strong claim that the denial violates Arti-
cles 2.3 and 4.1 of the SPS Agreement because it protects domes-
tic production.-78
In summary, the OFPA, if regarded as a sanitary measure,
may violate Articles 3.1, 2.3 and 4.1 of the SPS Agreement. The
OFPA would violate Article 3.1 because it does not adopt stan-
dards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Similarly, be-
cause the FDCA already regulates food safety and incorporates
the Codex Alimentarius standards, the OFPA appears designed
to protect U.S. production of organic food in violation of Article
2.3. Finally, the OFPA may violate Article 4.1 if it fails to recog-
nize equivalent foreign programs which guarantee similar prod-
uct quality.
B. THE OFPA AS A NON-SANITARY MEASURE UNDER GATT
Analysis of the OFPA as a non-sanitary measure under
GATT can be approached in two ways. First, viewed as a prod-
uct regulation, the OFPA is covered by Article III:4. To fall
under Article III:4, the regulation must be found to regulate
products qua products. If the OFPA is instead viewed as a pro-
cess regulation, it could be challenged as an import restriction
under Article XI.
While for the purposes of this analysis it is acceptable to
assume that the OFPA is both a process and a product regula-
tion, a WTO panel addressing a challenge to the OFPA would
176. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
177. Because the final rules for the OFPA certification program are not yet
set, this is an open issue. However, some of the open issues do not affect the
end quality of organic products, but instead reflect environmental concerns of
the organic food consumer lobby. Clark, supra note 16.
178. Of course, the party bringing the claim would have to show there was
no difference between the products. But the reason for the ongoing debate over
the final organic rules is that the methods are perceived to be environmentally
responsible rather than because of any effect they have on the end products.
See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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still need to make this determination. The Tuna/Dolphin deci-
sion gives some guidance on how to distinguish between product
or process regulations. The Tuna/Dolphin Panel found that the
process regulation had no effect on any characteristic of the end-
product; as a result, the regulation was not covered by Article
111.179 Whether the OFPA affects end-product characteristics of
organic foods is a closer question. The OFPA is not written in
terms of a resulting end-product.' 80 Even so, a strong argument
can be made that the organic certification requirements are in-
tended to insure contaminant-free products by regulating the
process inputs. On the other hand, the fact that some organic
processes are preferred precisely because they are more environ-
mentally friendly than conventional methods points toward a
process classification not affecting the end-products.' 8 '
1. Article XI
A party challenging the OFPA under GATT Article XI
would initially have to establish that the OFPA acts as an im-
port ban or restriction. If treated as a process regulation, the
OFPA may act as an import ban on foods produced under
equivalent foreign programs that are denied recognition. While
denying an equivalent organic program the ability to use the
USDA label does not constitute a de jure import ban, it has the
same effect. Exclusion from the U.S. market would occur be-
cause the foreign organic food could not be sold competitively in
the market.
Without the certified organic label, foreign organic food
could not compete for a variety of reasons. First, since organic
food is more costly to produce, it could not compete with conven-
tionally produced domestic food on price. It also could not com-
pete with the domestically produced organic food because
consumers would not purchase the unlabeled imported food at
organic prices. Thus, denying an equivalently produced foreign
organic food the opportunity to carry any organic label would
have the effect of a ban on the imports.
A counter-argument to the assertion that the OFPA acts as
an import ban is that it is voluntary. Foreign producers, there-
fore, could adjust their organic certification programs to comply
with the OFPA if they wanted to participate in the U.S. market.
However, the fact that the OFPA rules will likely reflect current
179. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 85-87 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7:399
THE OFPA UNDER GATT
U.S. practices and preferences indicates it operates to benefit do-
mestic producers. A foreign producer following a program which
differs only slightly from the OFPA has a strong argument that,
if the program is not recognized as equivalent, the OFPA acts as
an import ban to equivalently produced products and thus vio-
lates Article XI.
One way a party could bring an Article XI challenge is as
follows: First, a complaining party could demonstrate its coun-
try's food is classified as organic in its home market because the
growing and handling are done according to local regulations.
Second, the party would have to show its country's organic pro-
gram results in identical end-products. Third, because the for-
eign standard is not recognized, the OFPA is essentially an
import ban on the complaining party's organic food in violation
of Article XI.
If a complaining party establishes that the OFPA violates
Article XI, the United States could assert either an Article
XI:2(c)(i) or an Article XX defense. Article XI:2(c)(i) exempts cer-
tain import restrictions for agricultural products.18 2 The food
products covered by the OFPA are certainly in the agricultural
category. However, of the seven conditions precedent to raising
a successful exception, the United States would fail to satisfy at
least two.' 8 3 The first condition the OFPA would likely fail is
that it does not set up a domestic quantitative supply restric-
tion.184 "Restriction," as used in Article XI:2(c)(i), is related to a
quantitative limitation, not a restriction on how a product is
characterized. The second condition the OFPA fails to meet is
that its impact is not a restriction on foreign organic products,
but a prohibition.18 5 As it fails to meet these two conditions, the
OFPA would not likely meet the Article XI:2(c)(i) exception for
import restrictions.
Another defense the United States could raise would be an
Article XX exception. The United States would likely assert the
OFPA is necessary to protect human health, and thus is ex-
empted from GATT obligations by Article XX(b).18 6 An Article
XX(b) defense, however, would most likely be classified as a san-
itary measure, necessarily implicating the SPS Agreement. As
already demonstrated, the OFPA would most likely violate vari-
182. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
184. See Japan-Agricultural Products, supra note 106, 5.1.
185. Id. This assumes that the OFPA is being enforced by denying certifica-
tion to an equivalent foreign certification program.
186. GATT art. XX(b).
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ous provisions of the SPS Agreement.18 7 Even as a non-sanitary
measure, the OFPA would most likely fail under Article XX(b)
because it is not "necessary" to protect human health. That
function is already performed by the FDCA, which insures food
safety in the United States.
As a process regulation, the OFPA can act as an import ban.
As such, it would violate Article XI. Defenses to the Article XI
violation would likely fail. The OFPA may not qualify as an Ar-
ticle XI:2(c)(i) restriction because it is not a quantitative restric-
tion. Similarly, the OFPA is unlikely to pass muster as an
Article XX(b) exception because it is not "necessary." Alterna-
tively, if the OFPA is characterized as a permitted sanitary mea-
sure, it violates the SPS Agreement.
C. THE OFPA AS A NON-SANITARY PRODUCT REGULATION
As a product regulation, the OFPA is open to challenge
under either the TBT Agreement or GATT Article III:4. Under
the TBT Agreement, the OFPA could be attacked as a technical
regulation protecting the domestic organic food industry. A
GATT Article III:4 challenge can be made if an equivalent for-
eign organic program is denied certification under the USDA or-
ganic label.
A party could raise various challenges to the OFPA under
the TBT Agreement.188 First, a party could challenge the OFPA
under TBT Article 2.8, which requires that, whenever appropri-
ate, technical regulations be based on product performance re-
quirements.18 9 Organic food regulations could be specified in
terms of product characteristics. For example, organic food
could be defined as contaminant-free, since many organic food
consumers purchase organic food for precisely this reason. 190
Given the consumer belief that organic food is more healthful
than conventionally produced food, it would be appropriate for
the OFPA regulations to target product characteristics rather
than process regulations. 191 Ironically, the United States made
this same argument against the European Union's measures in
187. See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
188. The OFPA on its face meets the definition of a technical regulation. See
supra notes 141-45. Concededly, the objective of the OFPA, if accepted to be for
the prevention of deceptive practices, is legitimate. However, there is the argu-
ment that the actual purpose of the Act is to protect domestic production. This
Note assumes the objective of the OFPA is legitimate.
189. TBT Agreement art. 2.8.
190. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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the Beef Hormones case. 192 The crux of the U.S. argument in
Beef Hormones, which applies to the OFPA with equal force,
was that the European Union's claim that the use of growth hor-
mones resulted in different end-products was not justified. 193
The end-products were the same.
This argument is exactly on point with respect to organic
and non-organic food. 194 The FDCA already regulates food
safety in the United States. 195 Thus, the OFPA allows an addi-
tional label on food already determined to be safe under the
FDCA. The only apparent difference between organic and con-
ventionally produced food is in the production method used. Be-
cause only the production methods differ, the organic product
distinction appears to be the type that Article 2.8 seeks to avoid,
namely one not based on product characteristics.
A party could also challenge the OFPA under Article 2.7,
which encourages Members to accept foreign equivalent techni-
cal standards if the foreign regulations fulfill the objectives of
the domestic regulation. 196 While the language of Article 2.7 is
not as strongly worded as the requirement to accept foreign
equivalent measures in Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement, the
analysis is similar under each.197 Where the Secretary of Agri-
culture fails to recognize a foreign organic program that is sub-
stantially equivalent to the OFPA, such failure to recognize will
go against the spirit of Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement.
One way to avoid going against the spirit of Article 2.7
would be to base the OFPA rules on internationally accepted
standards. However, no international scientific body currently
addresses the scientific aspects of production and processing of
organic food. 198 If such standards existed and were adopted by
the OFPA, the OFPA would enjoy a presumption of validity
under Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement. However, until such
192. See Beef Hormones, supra note 2, 4.246.
193. Id.
194. If such a challenge is ever brought against the OFPA, the United
States would not likely concede the point.
195. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
196. See TBT Agreement art. 2.7.
197. See supra notes 118, 154 and accompanying text.
198. There is a body trying to coordinate the international efforts of the or-
ganic movement, International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
(IFOAM). However, IFOAM is aimed at implementing organic methods as a
matter of social, as opposed to scientific, policy. IFOAM (visited Feb. 4, 1998)
<http://www.ecoweb.dk/ifoam/general.htm>.
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standards exist, Article 2.7 prefers that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture seriously consider foreign equivalent organic measures. 199
In addition to a challenge under the TBT Agreement, a
party could also challenge the OFPA under Article 111:4 of
GATT. Article III:4 prohibits internal regulations which treat
foreign products less favorably than "like" domestic products.200
The situation where this is most likely to occur is when the Sec-
retary of Agriculture fails to recognize a substantially
equivalent foreign organic program. Failure to recognize foreign
programs could violate Article III:4 because denying the im-
ported product the organic label would treat it less favorably
than the "like" domestic product.
To prevail on this claim, a foreign organic program would
first have to establish that its products were "like" domestic or-
ganic products within the meaning of Article 111:4. WTO panels
consider factors such as consumer preferences, tariff classifica-
tion, end use, and physical properties and characteristics when
determining whether products are "like."201 These factors point
toward a finding that organic and conventionally produced foods
are "like" products. Organic and conventionally produced prod-
ucts enjoy the same tariff classification. The use of organic and
conventional food is identical-both are consumed for nutri-
tional purposes. The physical properties and characteristics of
organic and conventional food are the same. Even the healthful
aspects are the same, at least as measured by the FDCA stan-
dards. The only difference between organic and non-organic
food is the consumer preference for the former. It is unlikely
consumer preference alone would prevent a finding of "likeness"
under Article 111:4.202
Upon a showing of "likeness," a complaining party must fur-
ther establish that the foreign products are treated less favora-
bly. Certainly, denial of an organic label to products from
substantially equivalent programs constitutes less favorable
treatment. Specifically, less favorable treatment occurs be-
cause, absent the organic label, the foreign products cannot be
imported. Once a party establishes their foreign program pro-
duces "like" products to those produced under the OFPA, failure
to recognize the foreign program would most likely violate Arti-
cle 111:4 of GATT.
199. See TBT Agreement art. 2.7.
200. GATT art. III:4.
201. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
202. See id.
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The United States could raise three possible defenses to this
type of Article III:4 challenge. First, it could invoke a GATT Ar-
ticle XX(b) defense that the OFPA is a health or safety mea-
sure. 20 3 However, as previously discussed, an Article XX(b)
defense would most likely fail as a sanitary measure under the
SPS Agreement. 20 4
A second possible defense would be that the OFPA is not
covered by Article III:4 because it is aimed at processes not prod-
ucts. If the OFPA is characterized as a process regulation, it
would not violate GATT Article 111:4 because Article 111:4 covers
only regulations that relate to products as products.205 Charac-
terizing the OFPA, however, as a process regulation opens it to
challenge under the TBT Agreement. As previously shown, the
OFPA would most likely violate the TBT Agreement.20 6
A final defense would be a claim that organic and non-or-
ganic products are not "like" for Article III:4 purposes. This ar-
gument is weak at best because the only recognized difference
between organic and conventional food is consumer preference.
It would be a slippery slope indeed if the United States were
allowed to cure what is otherwise an Article III:4 violation by
raising the sole defense of consumer preference in support of the
distinction.
IV. CONCLUSION
While there may be a strong consumer preference in the
United States for organic food, the OFPA appears vulnerable to
a challenge under the triumvirate of GATT, the SPS Agreement
and the TBT Agreement. Although the OFPA is supported by a
variety of disparate interests, including health conscious con-
sumers and environmental groups, it must be fine tuned to avoid
conflicts with international trade obligations. The most prob-
lematic issue surrounding the OFPA concerns the criteria the
Secretary of Agriculture will use to grant foreign organic pro-
grams recognition. If the current OFPA rule formulation dis-
pute is any indication, domestic consumer and producer groups
will likely lobby the Secretary to limit recognition to foreign pro-
grams that meet or exceed the OFPA requirements. The United
States should ameliorate the possibility for challenge by leading
an international effort to harmonize the various organic food
203. GATT art. XX(b).
204. See supra notes 161-78, 185-87 and accompanying text.
205. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 83, 5.10.
206. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
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programs in operation throughout the world. As leader of the
harmonization effort, the United States could mold the interna-
tional standard to reflect the goals of the OFPA and promote in-
creased international trade in organic products.
